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Punishment or therapy? The ethics of sexual
offending treatment
Tony Ward*
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract The claim that sex offender treatment is a form of punishment and as such cannot be
covered by traditional ethical codes is a controversial one. It challenges the ethical basis of current
practice and compels clinicians to rethink the work they do with sex offenders. In this paper I comment
on Bill Glaser’s defence of that idea in a challenging and timely paper and David Prescott and Jill
Leveson’s rejection of his claims. First, I consider briefly the nature of both punishment and treatment
and outline Glaser’s argument and Prescott and Levenson’s rejoinder. I then investigate what a
comprehensive argument for either position should look like and finish with a few comments on each
paper.
Keywords Punishment; sex offenders; treatment
Introduction
The claim that sex offender treatment is a form of punishment, and as such cannot be covered
adequately by professional mental health ethical codes, is a controversial one. It challenges the
ethical basis of current practice and compels clinicians to rethink the work they do with sex
offenders. After all, if participation in treatment programmes by offenders simply represents
an extension of punishment, then therapists are actually implementing state-endorsed
sanctions rather than interventions intended to heal or to enhance psychological functioning.
For some this is a chilling thought, and conjures up the spectre of repressive political regimes
committed to manipulating and coercing citizens to adopt moral norms under the guise of
curing the sick. Whatever the association, one thing is clear: the truth ought to be confronted
and dealt with and not simply ignored for the sake of easing troubled consciences, or even
worse, in order to advance questionable moral agendas.
The relevance of this topic for clinicians working with any kind of offender is obvious.
Individuals who have been sentenced to prison or probation following a sexual offence have
done something both illegal and morally wrong (Ward & Salmon, 2009). It follows that the
wrongness of their actions is one of the reasons they received state-endorsed sanctions and,
therefore, why they have been accepted for sex offending treatment. The stress is on treatment
for their sexual offending-related problems and actions, rather than their general mental state,
because these factors are the focus of therapy. The point I want to get across here is that the
normative environment within which sexual offending practitioners work contains aspects of
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both punishment and rehabilitation (treatment). There is no rationally acceptable way of
avoiding this fact and, indeed, the convergence of the ethical (punishment) and the
rehabilitative in the criminal justice arena is the source of the controversy being examined
in this debate. If treatment is an aspect of punishment, then this means it is not really
treatment in the traditional sense of this term. If punishment is inappropriate, this means that
sex offenders ought not to be punished and should instead receive therapy for their various
psychological problems. If both are necessary elements of a just and fair response to sexual
offending, then just how are the two normative frameworks to be configured, and how do
clinicians juggle their often conflicting demands?
One of the many virtues of Bill Glaser’s work is his fearlessness with regard to ethical
issues in the sexual offending arena. In previous papers and in this debate he examines
relentlessly the ethical assumptions underpinning sexual offending practice and draws out
their logical implications carefully (e.g. Glaser, 2003; 2010). In his view, both the practices
evident in criminal justice programmes and sexual offending treatment are more akin to
punishment than treatment, at least in the typical meaning of punishment. In contrast, Jill
Levenson and her colleagues are adamantly opposed to Glaser’s conclusion and show an
admirable attention to the nuances of clinical practice with sex offenders in the development
of their argument (Levenson & D’Amora, 2005; Prescott & Levenson, 2010).
The papers contained in this debate are fine (and spirited!) examples of contrasting views
concerning the relationship between treatment and punishment and, as such, do the readers
great service by articulating distinct viewpoints. I agree with Jeremy Waldron (1993) that
moral disagreement is essential for a healthy society, especially so in areas where the dangers
of inflicting harm on vulnerable individuals is high. The fact that the language used in both
papers is strong and the convictions expressed forcefully does not, on its own, detract from
their key ideas or undermine the merits of their supporting arguments. As Waldron says,
moral distress caused by awareness of opposing views oils the wheels of ethical and intellectual
progress. The absence of intense emotion in the face of contrasting viewpoints shows,
arguably, that we simply do not really care enough about our own values. The key issue is: are
you listening and have you responded to the challenges posed by others in an intellectually
rigorous and appropriate way? In my view, the authors of these papers do this and we should
be grateful for their attention to the complex matter of punishment and treatment.
In this paper I comment on Glaser’s defence of the claim in a challenging and timely paper
that sex offender treatment is punishment, and Prescott and Levenson’s rejection of his claim.
First, I consider briefly the nature of both punishment and treatment and outline Glaser’s
argument and Prescott and Levenson’s rejoinder. I then investigate what a comprehensive
argument for either position should look like and finish with a few comments on each paper.
I regard Glaser’s paper as the target one, because he has taken on the job of challenging the
received view of sex offending treatment and its ethical nature. Therefore, I pay more attention
to his argument than that of Prescott and Levenson.
What is punishment and treatment?
Before reflecting on the arguments of both papers it makes sense to first define the terms
punishment and treatment, at least as used in the context of the debate. State-inflicted
punishment in the criminal justice system involves the intentional imposition of a burden on
an individual following his or her violation of important social norms that are intended to
protect significant common interests of members of the political community (Bennett, 2008;
Duff, 2001). Specifically, punishment in the criminal justice system has five necessary
































elements (Boonin, 2008). The actions constituting punishment are authorized (by the state),
intentional (directed toward a particular end or action outcome), reprobative (express
disapproval or censure), retributive (follow a wrongful act committed by the offender) and
harmful (result in suffering, a burden or deprivation to the offender).
It is evident that according to this definition the intention of an individual administering
punishment is crucial with regard to deciding what kind of action in which he or she is
engaged. The infliction of harm that follows from an action intended to not result in harm, or
even to benefit an individual, is not punishment, according to the above analysis. Glaser
essentially follows this definition, and because Prescott and Levenson do not contest his
analysis we can assume they accept it.
The term treatment is not defined comprehensively or explicitly by either Glaser or
Prescott and Levenson in their respective papers, although the latter do state that
‘‘Rehabilitation is defined as restoring an individual to good health or a useful life through
therapy and education. Punishment and rehabilitation are distinct goals of criminal justice,
though they may both be facilitated through a sentence pronounced after conviction of a
crime’’. Treatment can mean simply action or conduct intended to advance someone’s goals;
for example: ‘‘I treated him with respect when administering punishment’’. In this sense of the
term, treatment is entirely consistent with punishment. The more relevant sense of the term
refers to its use in administering interventions intended to heal or manage a person’s (physical
or psychological) disorder or affliction. According to this sense of the term, the primary
reason for treating someone is to restore him or her to a state of wellbeing and thus enable him
or her to live a functionally better life. Treating an offender is thought to be in his or her own
interests, and any benefits for the greater community are secondary. There may be borderline
cases in which the interests of both the community and the person being treated are equally
important. In the case of someone suffering from a contagious disease, quarantining him or
her will protect others from infection and treatment during this period of imposed isolation
will benefit directly the individuals concerned. It could be argued that sex offender therapy is
like this, in that successful treatment will have positive effects for the wider community and
also for a person participating in a therapy programme. The associated terms of rehabilitation
and therapy have similar meanings, except that in the case of the former it has been applied
more widely to offenders.
The core argument
The ethical problem concerning treatment and punishment is straightforward and can be
outlined in terms of two broad possibilities, with some suboptions. First, do actions associated
with punishment and treatment coexist within a sex offender treatment programme? And
should they? Secondly, if not, is this because (a) they are functionally separate with
punishment occurring outside the therapeutic orbit or (b) because only (or primarily)
punishment is actually apparent within the therapy context? Prescott and Levenson argue for
(a) and Glaser opts for (b). My own preference is for the rather messier option of coexistence,
namely the first possibility (see below).
In a nutshell, Glaser argues that because sex offender treatment occurs within a criminal
justice context and thus contains aspects of punishment, traditional ethical codes are unable
to guide practitioners in the delivery of therapeutic services. He claims the ethically relevant
aspects of the criminal justice context include lack of consent, the intentional infliction of
harm apparent in some treatment strategies (e.g. cognitive restructuring), disregard of

































public and not to restore or enhance the functional capacity and wellbeing of offenders. He
concludes that sex offender treatment fits the definition of punishment rather more closely
than that of treatment. Furthermore, Glaser states that continuing to use traditional mental
health professional codes is likely to result in unethical behaviour because ‘‘any attempt by
therapists in sex offender treatment programmes to cling to traditional codes to justify their
practices is deceitful and duplicitous for the clients and corrupts the integrity of the therapists
themselves’’. He maintains that once one accepts that sex offender treatment contains aspects
of punishment, it follows logically that only a justified theory of punishment can provide the
necessary ethical guidance to sex offender practitioners. The model he proposed is a
consequentialist one ‘‘which aims to maximize individual liberties and rights, rather than
crime prevention, as a target for criminal justice interventions’’. Glaser agued that therapists
should be honest with offenders, that treatment is an aspect of punishment, but reassure them
that such punishment will be delivered in ways that are consistent with human rights and the
maximization of liberty of all concerned (including offenders). Furthermore, he comments
that such an approach is more respectful of offenders, is transparent concerning the aims of
treatment, and is less likely to result in abuses of power within a therapeutic context.
In response to Glaser, Prescott and Levenson argue that, in general, traditional codes of
ethics (e.g. social workers’ and psychologists’ ethical codes) do address the issue of balancing
the rights of clients with those of others and, further, that Glaser is incorrect to state that they
do not. Prescott and Levenson contend that because offenders’ rights have to be considered
by therapists, they are not simply agents of social control. They point out that mental health
ethical codes allow for the breaking of confidentiality in specific circumstances, that this is not
a ‘‘routine’’ occurrence, and that not all breaches arise from the neglect of clients’ wellbeing.
Relatedly, their view is that a crude juxtaposition of offenders versus the rights of others
amounts to a false dichotomy, one that does not do justice to the ethical complexities of
current sex offender practice.
A major thrust of Prescott and Levenson’s critique of Glaser’s paper is directed at what
they consider his inaccurate depiction of best practice sex offender treatment. They think he
glosses over aspects of sex offender treatment that are intended to benefit the offender, and
assert that such beneficial consequences are intended and not simply the side effects of
treatment. Prescott and Levenson state that Glaser also fails to note that confidentiality issues
are addressed systematically by therapists dealing with sexual offending and that offenders
exercise their autonomy when making choices concerning their participation in treatment and
the information they disclose.
Comments
General
What should an argument that is capable of demonstrating that because sex offender
treatment is essentially punishment, and thus professional ethical codes are unable to justify
and guide practitioners in their work with offenders look like? Similarly, what logical steps
does an advocate of the traditional view, that sex offender treatment is distinct from
punishment and is therefore covered sufficiently by mental health ethical codes, need to go
through to support his or her conclusions? In my opinion, the answers to both questions are
surprisingly complex; I think Glaser and Prescott and Levenson fall short of these logical
requirements, and therefore do not provide persuasive arguments to support their views.
The initial necessary step in such an argument is to analyse carefully the concepts of
punishment and treatment (and their synonyms) in order to establish that the two ideas have
































distinct meanings and are related to diverse practices within criminal justice systems. Once
this has been achieved, it remains to identify the corresponding practices within criminal
justice systems, if they exist. Failure to undertake both these tasks may undermine either of
the above positions concerning the relationship between treatment and punishment in one of
two ways. First, it may be that the concepts overlap in meaning in some important respects
and are therefore related conceptually; or secondly, that even if they are distinct, one or the
other may not be applicable to sex offending treatment. Thus, it may be that the practices of
punishment are not evident in the sexual offending treatment domain (as argued by Prescott
and Levenson) or that (as Glaser maintains) they are, and furthermore, what is commonly
understood as treatment does not exist.
It is evident that the analyses of treatment and punishment within criminal justice
systems undertaken in both papers are not sufficiently comprehensive. In fact, part of the
disagreement between Glaser and Prescott and Levenson revolves around this issue. For
example, Prescott and Levenson take Glaser to task for not appreciating treatment as it is
understood traditionally within the sexual offending domain; while Glaser, rightly in my view,
states that some aspects of what have been regarded as sex offender treatment meet the
definition of punishment. For example, cognitive restructuring in part involves clinicians
seeking to establish a sense of responsibility and its associated feeling of guilt in offenders.
This meets the definition of punishment in the following way. The actions that constitute
cognitive restructuring (or least some of them) are (a) authorized by the state or agency; (b)
intentional, in that the clinician is aiming to achieve the end of inducing responsibility and its
associated effects; (c) reprobative, in that they express disapproval of the wrongful actions*
sexual abuse; (d) retributive, in that they follow the wrongful acts*sexual abuse; and (e)
harmful, in that the person experiences considerable distress as a consequence of the intended
interventions.
However, by way of contrast, it is clear that some aspects of sexual offending treatment
do not meet this definition and therefore cannot be construed meaningfully as aspects of
punishment. For example, interventions designed to improve offenders’ intimacy skills are
intended to improve the quality of their relationships and therefore their overall wellbeing.
The fact that this also reduces their risk of re-offending is, arguably, a side effect of the
intervention. More specifically, therapeutic actions in an intimacy module are (a) authorized
by the state or an agency; (b) intended to promote offenders level of functioning and
wellbeing; (c) not reprobative, because they are not intended to express disapproval, at least
not directly; (d) retributive, as they follow from the fact of sexual offending; and finally (e)
wellbeing-enhancing rather than harm-creating. The failure to meet criteria (c) and (e)
indicates that such actions are not examples of punishment and therefore that Prescott and
Levenson are correct in asserting that some parts of sex offender treatment cannot be
conceptualized accurately as punishment.
The second step in establishing an overall conclusion concerning the relationship
between treatment and punishment is to demonstrate that existing codes of professional ethics
either can, or cannot, cover the following possibilities ethically. In essence, this means
demonstrating that ethical codes can guide practice when (a) the treatment of sex offenders
only contains elements of punishment or (b) when it contains elements of both punishment
and treatment. (The option that sex offending treatment programmes do not reveal any
aspects of punishment is not relevant in this context and thus is not discussed.) If the
conclusion is that traditional ethical codes cannot do either of these things, then it is necessary
to show that some other ethical theory, such as a theory of punishment, can provide ethical

































It seems to me that neither of the papers deals adequately with this logical requirement.
First, because both fail to establish their conclusion at the first step of the overall argument, it
follows that neither have supported their conclusions that treatment in total is, or is not,
punishment. Secondly, putting this problem to one side for the moment, Glaser has not
shown systematically that traditional ethical codes are unable to deal with the punishment
aspects of treatment, although the evidence he presents in the first part of his paper builds a
strong, if not conclusive, case for this assertion. If sex offender treatment has elements of both
punishment and treatment it may be true that ethical codes can guide practice effectively in
the treatment domain at least. Relatedly, it could be argued that a sufficiently rich theory of
punishment can deal with treatment aspects as well as punishment components of sex
offender treatment. Prescott and Levenson simply assume it cannot. The problem is that the
proponents of both positions have not shown clearly that treatment is either totally wellbeing-
enhancing or sanction-enforcing at the outset.
In conclusion, it seems to me that sex offender treatment does have some aspects of
punishment, and also clearly contains strategies that are intended to enhance the functioning
of the offenders and that therefore do not meet the criteria for punishment. Neither of the
papers demonstrates that traditional ethical codes (suitably enriched by human rights
concepts) or theories of punishment can, or cannot, provide an ethical justification for such
hybrid practices. Another possibility is that more than one ethical theory will be required to
justify and guide sex offender treatment. From this perspective, it is anticipated that there
could be overlapping, although distinct, normative theories that deal with the punishment and
the treatment aspects of intervention, respectively. In this possible scenario, the nature of the
practice tasks will dictate what ethical resources are drawn from at any point in time. The
reality may well be that because of the complex combination of morality and treatment-related
values apparent in the criminal justice domain it is not sensible, or even possible, to rely only
upon one type of ethical framework (Ward & Salmon, 2009).
I will now make a few specific comments on the two papers.
Comments on Glaser’s paper
Holding people accountable can be part of treatment for a range of disorders, including
relationship counselling or any interventions that involve interpersonal relationships. An
important part of such therapy could be assisting clients to acknowledge the harm they have
inflicted on other people. However, the aim is to help the person establish better relationships
and also accept responsibility in order to live a better life in future. There is no intention to
inflict suffering on the person because of his or her past actions in order to express
disapproval. Thus, such actions do not meet the criteria for punishment, although they do
involve the infliction of harm. The harm here is a consequence of interventions designed to
improve a person’s functioning. Similarly, many of the interventions undertaken by
correctional practitioners are undertaken to improve offenders’ functioning and are not
aspects of punishment. Some components of cognitive restructuring are intended to induce
guilt, but the overall aim is to help a person fashion a better life, not to balance the moral
ledger. This is why we have argued that while punishment and rehabilitation practices may
overlap, they are distinct normative frameworks (Ward & Salmon, 2009).
A second point is that Glaser appears to have conflated the overall aim of rehabilitation
with specific treatment aims. Thus, while the overall aim might be to protect the community it
does not follow that the specific aims of treatment are not focused primarily upon enhancing
offenders’ wellbeing (although it must be acknowledged that according to Glaser, enhancing
offender wellbeing is an important consideration when implementing punishment). It is
































certainly not clear to me how attempting to improve offenders’ level of esteem or their ability
to achieve intimate relationships meets any of the criteria for punishment. This is a problem of
conflating levels of analysis, and accounts for some of the disagreement between Prescott and
Levenson, and Glaser.
Thirdly, to say, as Glaser does, that a hybrid ethical code is beyond the ethical
competency of clinicians is question-begging and, I suspect, incorrect. For one thing,
clinicians always have to be aware of the task in which they are engaged at any point of time,
and its aims and associated ethical standing. It seems obvious to me that while an aim of
cognitive restructuring could be to inflict a state of remorse or guilt because of the wrongful
acts a person has committed, and thus meets the criteria for punishment, intimacy
enhancement clearly does not. This does not seem to be a particularly difficult discriminatory
task. The two frameworks are overlapping but distinct. Thus there can be sex offender
treatment practices that clearly resemble punishment in nature; some may be obviously
therapeutic and others may have elements of both. This is the reality of correctional practice
and is what makes it so ethically complex. Furthermore, a hybrid code is one which recognizes
that working with offenders involves a number of different tasks, each of which vary in terms
of whether they are intended to address aspects of an offender’s wellbeing (guided by
prudential values) or alternatively directed to an offender as a moral agent (i.e. a stress on
accountability). The confusion that Glaser worries about can be reduced by ensuring that
punishment and wellbeing interventions are consistent with basic human rights and the
inherent dignity that human rights protect. Thus human rights can be applied to the various
domains of life, their role being to ensure that the wellbeing and freedom conditions required
for individuals’ exercise of their agency are safeguarded. Clinicians have a responsibility to
respect the inherent dignity of offenders by setting limits on individuals’ choices that are
justified and do everything they can to maximize their choices and wellbeing.
Fourthly, Glaser is concerned that an ethical code purely founded upon human rights
right will not be responsive enough to the fact that offenders have morally transgressed and
could result in insufficient attention to their status as rights violators while emphasizing their
entitlements. This is unlikely, in my view, because all human beings hold human rights which
ensure that their core interests and needs are met (positive and negative duties) by other
members of the human family. This holds for offenders as well as for non-offenders. The
institution of punishment is constituted by a lower level set of ethical norms that follows
logically from the moral equality of all individuals. By lower-level norms, I mean those that are
justified or grounded by values such as those protected by human rights. Punishment norms
are justified only if they result in actions that, among other constraints, do not violate
individuals’ dignity by overriding their autonomy without justification, or result in them living
lives that fall below the threshold of what is considered acceptable (e.g. substandard housing,
infliction of violence, etc.). If individuals fail to act in ways consistent with human rights
norms they can be held to account. The nature of the sanctions that can be directed against
them depends upon the kind of harm they have inflicted upon others. Human rights were
never designed to stand alongside punishment norms; they underpin them, and are ethically
more fundamental (Gewirth, 1981, 1996; Ward & Birgden, 2007). If it is reasonable to accept
that all human beings hold human rights by virtue of their nature, then someone who violates
unjustifiably the rights of another can be held to account morally. The institution of
punishment specifies one way in which the curtailment of human rights can occur.
Fifthly, a worrying aspect of Glaser’s position is that it appears to amount to an
accommodation to current political and social viewpoints without questioning their ethical
soundness. While it might be the case that the rehabilitation of offenders is wedded firmly to

































make it ethically acceptable. Perhaps this is what Prescott and Levenson are responding to in
Glaser’s paper. There is always the option of engaging in ethical and political critique and
objecting to current correctional practices as unethical. Glaser does not seem to have
considered this possibility although, to be fair, he does state that his is a pragmatic ethical
approach and therefore intended to apply in current social and correctional circumstances.
His argument is that treatment should be conceptualized as punishment because this best
captures current attitudes and practices. In order to modulate the harshness of punishment
and related treatment he proposes we should guide our practice by a combination of human
rights norms and a consequential theory of punishment. It is possible to challenge these
assumptions by arguing that current attitudes are wrong, because they deny offenders their
moral status as human beings. Furthermore, it could be asserted that such a view does not
describe or capture accurately what actually occurs in sex offending treatment agencies.
Finally, I have doubts as to whether Braithwaite and Pettit’s dominion consequential
theory of punishment can provide the kind of ethical underwriting of sex offender treatment
that Glaser hopes for. A concern is that the major focus of the dominion theory seems to be on
liberty and civil rights (first-generation rights), and thus neglects the full range of goods
protected by human rights such as education, health, basically the essential requirements for
the full development of the personality (second- and third-generation rights) as stipulated in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Ward & Birgden, 2007). If one accepts that
human dignity and its attendant conditions of empowerment and basic conditions of living
grounds human agency, then these conditions also need to be protected. Glaser draws from
Ward and Birgden’s justification of human rights, which in turn is heavily dependent upon
Alan Gewirth’s agency theory, and therefore he seems committed to the view that such goods
ought to be safeguarded by rights. A second concern is that because of his reliance upon
Braithwaite’s and Pettit’s theory of dominion, Glaser commits the fallacy of implementation
(Morsinck, 2009). He states that ‘‘enjoyment of dominion is a precondition for the possession
of fundamental human rights’’ (Glaser, 2010). The fallacy of implementation is committed
when human rights are identified with the concrete legal and social norms that implement
them, rather than being acknowledged as moral rights that predate their implementation.
Thus, human rights inhere in human beings from birth and can be used to evaluate critically
existing laws and social practices and norms. This criticism implies that a political order in
which individuals have ‘‘perfect liberty . . . enjoyed so far and only so far as a person relates to
other people, and to the institutions of his society . . .’’ (Braithwaite & Pettit, 1990, p.63) is
one where rights follow on from their social instantiation rather than precede them. I cannot
see how the concept of dominion represents an advance over the conception of human rights,
and as such it does not provide Glaser with an ethical justification of punishment.
Comments on Prescott and Levenson: treatment is not punishment
I have fewer specific comments to say about Prescott and Levenson’s paper. A first point is
that they seem to have misunderstood Glaser’s reasons for concluding that traditional ethical
codes cannot justify satisfactorily the curtailment of offenders’ liberty and autonomy. He
argues that traditional codes always place the interests of clients at the centre of their ethical
attention, while in the criminal justice arena the reverse is true. When he states that the
dominion theory can justify punishment in an ethically appropriately way he acknowledges
that sex offender therapists do engage in punishment practices. His point is that the dominion
theory is able to ensure that sexual offending clinicians respond respectfully to offenders’
interests. Glaser believes this is an advance over existing ethical codes, which proceed
hypocritically as if offenders are the focus of ethical concern, when in fact they are not really
































treated as such. He argues that while traditional ethical codes cannot serve ‘‘two masters’’ (i.e.
they are concerned primarily with clients’ interests), theories of punishment can, because of
their emphasis on human rights and the inherent dignity of all individuals, including
offenders.
A second specific comment is that while Prescott and Levenson do an excellent job of
capturing the nuances of sex offender therapy, they do not seem to appreciate fully that there
are aspects of treatment that appear to meet the criteria for punishment and furthermore, that
punishment can be implemented in ways that are respectful of offenders’ moral status.
Glaser’s points about offenders being forced to accept certain beliefs and so on are not
intended to deny that they can refuse to do so; of course they can. It is more a question of
clinicians thinking that they are implementing therapy when in such contexts this is not the
whole, or even the real, story. In fact, appreciating that some parts of cognitive restructuring
are punishment-like may well mean that offenders are treated more respectfully, as the aim is
to engage them in the process of taking responsibility as ethical agents. I have certainly seen
therapists badger offenders during cognitive restructuring under the guise of trying to help
them to understand their offending, when in fact they seem to be attempting to force them to
acquiesce to a particular view of what they did and why. While I appreciate that many
therapist do not behave like this, construing treatment entirely in non-punishment terms may
create such ethical flashpoints. I think Glaser is right to raise this possibility.
Finally, a real virtue of Glaser’s argument is that the moral and therapeutic facets of sex
offender treatment are thrown into the theoretical limelight and clinicians are confronted with
a number of ethical issues to which they might otherwise be blind. In my view, professional
ethical codes are weak with regard to the interface between ethics and mental health, and they
are often disappointingly shallow with regard to providing a grounding for specific rules and
duties (Ward, Gannon & Vess, 2009). Directly tying practice with sex offenders to a broad
theory of justice and punishment does have the merits of focusing discussion upon some
disturbing ethical gaps in our work.
Conclusion
I am delighted to have had the opportunity to comment on two such thoughtful and
interesting papers on treatment and punishment. While both papers have significant areas of
strength they also have some weaknesses, and require further work to press home their cases
concerning the relationship between treatment and punishment in the sexual offending
domain. In my view, the ethical issues involved are deep and connected conceptually with a
wide range of political and social principles and institutions. We are indebted to Bill Glaser,
David Prescott and Jill Levenson for creating new pathways into this important but neglected
area.
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